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The golden age was first; when Man yet new;
No rule but uncorrupted reason knew;
And, with a native bent, did good pursue.
Unforc’d by punishment, un-aw’d by fear.
His words were simple, and his soul sincere.
Ovidius Metamorphoses (first book)
1 Explaining the Great Divergence
The Great Divergence is the phenomenon that shows that Asias’s economic growth
lagged behind Europe’s economic growth for many 100 years, and indeed, until
only recently. Max Weber (1923), Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), David Landes (1998)
and other renowned scholars have tried to understand this puzzle. They point to the
economic sources of growth, such as capitalism, the availability of resources and
technologies, to explain the economic lead of Europe over Asia. Eric Jones,
however, has taken another position. In his book The European Miracle’’ (1981,
1987, 2003) he discusses the economic variables as well, but he argues for
considering first of all the political sources of economic growth that are rooted in the
organization of the State. The State determines economic growth because it has
command over the rule of law, over property rights, over trade and taxation, which
all determine indirectly the rate of growth of an economy.
When Jones refers to Asia he mostly means China while leaving India and South-
East Asia aside. We shall follow Jones in this regard because China is a well-defined
entity and therefore easier to discuss compared to the rest of Asia. But much of what
can be said about China is also applicable to the other countries and will be
summarized when appropriate.
We characterize China as a ‘‘contiguous’’ country because it is situated in a large
contiguous Continent. Europe is ‘‘split’’ in the sense of being ‘‘non-contiguous’’. It
is more than simply ‘‘divided’’ and less than ‘‘fissured’’.
According to Jones’ argument, the agents of the state in traditional China wanted to
maximize tax revenues. Therefore, taxed individuals had little incentives to invest.
Per capita income remained low, and Chinese growth lagged behind growth in Europe
where taxes were less exploitative and the rate of growth was higher. These
institutional differences prevented a convergence of the rates of growth of China and
of Europe. Jones writes: ‘‘Peasants were without redress against arbitrary taxes [in
China] to the point that eating any small surplus that the harvest did provide made
more sense to them than hazarding in new ventures’’ (p. 30). Europe, in contrast, had
more of a rule of law protecting its peasants from a sovereign’s caprice of taxation.
Therefore we observe higher growth rates in Europe than in Asia.
The factors determining taxation will be discussed in this paper, which is divided
in four sections. Section 2 provides a comparative theory of the history of taxation
in China and in Europe, and an illustrative breakdown with calibrated data is given
in Sect. 3. Section 4 summarizes what philosophers of the Enlightenment thought
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about taxation in Europe and in Asia. Section 5 provides further statistical evidence
while Sect. 6 is devoted to conclusions and generalizations.
2 A theory of taxation based on land and population
Jones describes taxation as autocratic in China and competitive in Europe. But why
was taxation different in China from taxation in Europe? Most scholars point to
history: they argue that the present taxation can only be understood from the
taxation in the past. Some countries have an authoritarian tax system because such a
system has been inherited from their history. But relying on history has a great
disadvantage. History follows a given time path: the French Revolution cannot be
placed before the 30 years’ war, and Henry VIII of England cannot reign before
Charlemagne, etc. But even after having established the right sequence of events, it
does not become clear which event is the decisive one. What was most important for
Europe: the French Revolution, Henri VIII, the 30 years’ war or Charlemagne? To
simply to begin somewhere is not convincing as the economist Paul David (1985)
correctly reminds us: ‘‘important influences upon the eventual outcome can be
exerted by temporally remote events.’’ Eric Jones seems to be aware of this
problem. In his book on The European Miracle, he therefore traces European
history back link by link up to the Mesolithic past (p. 11). But was the Mesolithic
past really relevant? What was relevant in the Mesolithic past and why? What was
before the Mesolithic past? Was the anterior history possibly relevant? Nobody
knows. The conclusion is that history is not a good guide to understand the present.
When using the past, a historian inevitably struggles in the trap of an infinite
regress: whatever event is declared as the ‘‘first event’’, it is inevitably an arbitrarily
chosen event. Jones makes no exception and he cannot escape this trap. If history is
to be understood, an exogenous variable outside it is needed to explain that history.
The governments of historical China had obviously more power to tax than the
governments in past Europe. But where does this power come from? Taxation
always comes from the interaction of land and individuals. Land alone is neutral. It
cannot be taxed as long as individuals are absent for only individuals can be taxed.
On the other hand individuals per se cannot be taxed either. A government cannot
get hold of individuals who cannot be tied to land at least for some time. A
bureaucrat is a good tax agent if he is able to link individuals to land in such way
that taxes are maximized. What specific tax is raised is a secondary problem within
his task because a tax is always capitalized in land values when individuals are
mobile: eventually every tax is a land tax.
In the early times of hunters and gatherers, individuals could hardly be taxed.
Landowners may have had plenty of land, but in addition there was a large amount
of unoccupied land, which allowed individuals to escape from taxation. Without
taxation the economy grew at a high rate as is recorded from China (see Sect. 3).
Gradually, however, land was filled up by individuals, and became scarce. What
could the individuals do? In a contiguous territory such as China individuals found it
difficult to escape from taxation by settling outside proprietary land. The
relationship between land and individuals has turned to the disadvantage of
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individuals. Land owners established themselves as governments who were able to
impose taxes from which individuals could not escape. This became possible
because the scarcity of land increased under the growing size of the population.
Proprietary land could no longer be avoided by individuals who wanted to settle.
Each landowner became able to tax the settlers according to the scarcity of his land,
and as the scarcities differed among lots of land, land owners could exploit settlers
at different rates. But land owners could make even more money if they merged and
taxed the individuals according to the price elasticity of demand for each lot.
Therefore, once land had become a source of taxation, landowners had a strong
incentive to merge into one large tax district leading eventually to the unification of
a country such as China (see Sect. 3).
If this theory is correct, its logic has to hold for any country and for Europe as
well. But Europe’s geography is different leading to a different form of taxation.
Europe is not only much smaller than China, its territory is also split in many islands
and peninsulas. Increasing the domain of land required higher costs in Europe than
in China. In contiguous China increasing a circular domain required constant costs
(c 9 2pr) while the surface of the territory (and the number of subjects) increased at
the second (c 9 pr2). In Europe, however, the costs of increasing the domain were
higher due to its split territory (larger than c 9 2pr) while the territory increased at
less than c 9 pr2. The benefit cost ratio from extending a domain was therefore less
favourable in Europe than in China. Consequently, the extension of domains
remained smaller in Europe than in China, and taxation was less exploitative in
Europe. Therefore, individuals invested more in Europe and GNP growth was larger
in Europe than in China.
Our critics may object that China is a split continent too, and they may be right.
But looking at the mere size of the two continents does make it clear that China is
more like a convex body whereas Europe looks more like a skeleton. Therefore,
with rising population Europe remained a multipolar power system without a
consolidation of the tax bases. Individuals in Europe who felt that their taxes were
too high, could emigrate into the niches of the continent situated between the sea
and the mountains which are often tax free zones, and often zones where the
settlement was promoted by competing governments by promising lower taxes.
Therefore individuals had a greater incentive to invest and therefore Europe
generated a higher rate of economic growth than China whose growth fell back and
added to the Great Divergence.
Jones has clearly seen the different effects which are generated by single power
system in China versus the multipolar system in Europe:
‘‘The proper units for our purposes are therefore the European states’ system and
the great contemporary empires. … Europe was bonded economically as much as
politically. A better understanding may be gained of the total economy of the states-
system by comparing and contrasting it with the other large economies of the time,
organized as they were in political empires, situated in Asia or at any rate in Asia
and the Middle East.’’ (pp. 25; 26). And most forcefully: ‘‘Europe as a whole might
have adopted one of several political forms. …Most of the large populations of the
world were organised into empires and the empires had been growing in size for
millennia … [In Europe] after the fall of Rome no empire was successfully built…,
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from the time of Charlemagne to the Habsburgs and beyond. The ambitions of
Charles V failed in the 1550s, the ambitions of his son Philip II failed, and the
Habsburgs failed again in the Thirty Years War, when Gustavus Adolphus,
subsidised by Richelieu in one of those cross-alliances that came to typify European
rivalries, was able to thwart them. Europe instead became a single system of states
in which change in one cell affected the others’’ (Jones 2003, p. 104). ‘‘It was more
important still that the number of states never shrank to one.’’ (p. 36).
Jones has a clear view of the state structures in China and in Europe. But he has
not yet tried to explain the conditions favouring an autocratic state system in China
and a multipolar state system in Europe. We share Jones’ view, but we have to
consider, in addition, the interrelationship between population, land and taxation on
both continents in order to explain taxation. As long as the population density was
small in the early periods of China and of Europe and land was abundant, as
indicated in fields (1) and (2) of Table 1 below, both Asia and Europe grew
substantially. But as land became scarce, escape from taxation became more
difficult in contiguous China (field 3) than in split Europe as indicated in field (4).
Land and homo oeconomicus may appear in whatever combination fields (1), (2) or
(4), land may be abundant or scarce, but the more land is contiguous, the larger will
be the State’s power to tax land plus individuals exploitatively and to stifle down the
rate of economic growth as in field (3).
3 Calibrated data
3.1 Early China
Let us assume a hypothetical day zero when the Eurasian sheet is opened for human
beings. On this initial day there is only homo oeconomicus and land. A third
resource, which is also given the first day, is climate, but let us assume that extreme
zones of climate are avoided and only moderate zones are chosen for living. Land is
available in unlimited quantities. Cost of an individual to increase its land is linear
at c 9 2pDr with the circumference in contiguous Asia as only invaders from
outside have to be thwarted. Land owners (as homines oeconomici) can derive
utility from land, but land alone provides little utility as long as it cannot be
combined with command over men. The problem for landowners is therefore to
obtain command over both land and men. Since men are mobile as hunters and
gatherers, they must be paid their marginal product in order to settle and be induced
to work on the land owners’ land. Any tax beyond their costs or any pay below their
marginal product induces these individuals to emigrate to unoccupied land and to
return to the life of hunters and gatherers. No rent or tax can be obtained beyond
costs: in equilibrium, different land owners have power over circles of land, but
none of them can exert command over men. This was the Golden Age as described
by Ovidius in his Metamorphoses at the outset of this paper.
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3.2 Later China
In Fig. 1 Early China is depicted with a red arrow far left on the bottom. The rates of
growth are high as there are no taxes in Early China. As soon, however, as land is
filled up in Later China emigration becomes difficult and costly and land owners
will charge settlers according to the scarcity of land. They become power holders
who will tax non-land owners for settling in their land. Taxes increase according to
land value, but initially remain restricted given that land owners are in competition.
But land owners grasp the opportunity of increasing their tax revenues even more by
mutually consolidating their tax bases. Separate domains merge into large entities.
China ceases to be a competitive power system. Its power holders consolidate
politically, eventually unify and become Imperial China by 323 B.C. which never
split again (see Sect. 6). This is why China’s unification has been placed in the
center of Fig. 1. China’s unification is the pivotal point between competitive and
despotic China.
3.3 Early Europe
Early Europe does not differ much from Early China. Early Europe is depicted by
the black arrow on the bottom of Fig. 1. The costs of expanding command over land
are presumably higher in Europe than c 9 2pDr in China because Europe has a split
geography. Moreover individuals are mobile in Early Europe preventing excessive
taxation.
3.4 Later Europe
Differs from later China because land is not contiguous, but split. The possibilities
of taxing individuals excessively are smaller in a split territory from which
individuals can escape into the niches between land and sea. Moreover autonomous
regional governments can emerge in a split territory and attract emigrants with
lower taxes. Competitive territories are sustainable in Europe but not in China
which has only provinces bound by instructions from above. Europeans have more
alternatives to escape from their sovereigns’ taxation and oppression than the
inhabitants of contiguous Asia. Therefore, systems competition can be sustained and
tax monopolies are avoided in Europe.
To put it differently: An autocratic system relying on command may work within
simple structures of contiguous territories. It breaks down in a complicated
Table 1 Population and the character of land
Land is Abundant Scarce
Contiguous (1) Early China (3) Later China
Split (2) Early Europe (4) Later Europe
Source: own compilation
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geographical environment where individuals find their own ways of utility
maximization.
The right hand side of Fig. 1 corresponds to the view which Jones and his
colleagues have developed on the Great Divergence. Systems competition in Europe
(black arrow) generates a higher economic growth than autocracy in Asia (red
arrow). But, in addition, we provide an explanation why systems competition
emerges in Europe and why autocracy dominates in China. In Asia population
density is high and emigration is limited because the continent is contiguous.
Therefore taxation is high and exploitative and growth rates are low. In Europe,
however, migration persists and leads to competition among territories.
Remember that Asia as well as Europe started competitively. When homo
oeconomicus first appeared, population density was small in China (lower part of
red arrow) as it was in Europe (black arrow). Mobility in China was, therefore, high
and so was economic and population growth. But the more China succeeded in
economic and population growth, the more it became trapped in the limited
availability of land, and hence the red arrow went upwards from competition to
autocracy.
Europe, which is depicted by the black arrow on the bottom of Fig. 1, also had
economic and population growth. But expanding domains was more costly in
Europe than in China and, in addition, escape from taxation was easier in split
Europe than in contiguous Asia. So Europe remained a competitive multistate
system while Asia became dominated by a few great empires.
This is exactly what Mo observes in terms of China’s antiquity when its
population was still relatively small (Mo 2004). Mo writes that a ‘‘well established
feudal system was founded by the Chou dynasty in 1122 B.C.’’ and then proceeds to
state ‘‘that more than 1,000 states were established by the Chou dynasty … The
survival possibilities of the states, and hence of the autocrats, were therefore
dependent on the states’ relative economic and military strengths. The fierce
Autocracy, 
high taxation
Split land; systems 
competition, high growth in 
Europe. Great Divergence
Contiguous land, 
Autocracies, low 
growth in China
0
Systems 
competition, 
low taxation
TIMEEarly China as homo 
oeconomicus 
appears
Early Europe
Later China, 
China conso-
lidates 323 B.C.
Later Europe
Europe
Later China up 
to the end of 
the 20th cent. 
Later Europe
Fig. 1 Autocracy and Systems competition in contiguous and in split territories. Source: own
compilation
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competition among the despotic rulers forced them to design and adopt institutions
favourable to economic development and hence military independence. This
resulted in the most important and exceptional period in the formation of China and
her culture’’ (Mo 2004, p. 58).1
This prosperous period ended in the second half of the third century B.C. when
China’s population had grown to 27 % of the world population, indeed an enormous
success in economic growth under a competitive regime. It should be noted,
however, that the ongoing theories of the Great Divergence cannot explain why
early China had such a large population in the first millennium B.C. Our two-stage
theory depicted in Fig. 1 is, however, able to explain both: early and later China.2
But due to this success land became scarce in China, high population density
made emigration difficult within China’s contiguous territory, and consequently
States became increasingly powerful. They became natural monopolies whose tax
power increased with their size, and mergers increased that power even further.
Therefore, it is not surprising to observe cumulative state mergers in the first half of
the 3rd century B.C., a process that ended with China’s unification in 323 B.C.
China’s territorial natural monopoly was so strong that it has remained unified and
never disintegrated through the present (see Sect. 6).
It is true that an enlightening interlude of this depressing history appeared with the
Sung dynasty with its open economic policy from 960 to 1275 A.D. This dynasty
promoted trade and navigation based on a fleet of junks flowing over the oceans
allegedly even around Africa. But progress came to a halt again under the following
Ming dynasty (1368–1644) when the ownership and the use of large boats became a
cause for capital punishment. The following dynasties pursued similar policies, with
interludes,3 up to the founding of the People’s Republic of China of 1949.
These theoretical considerations are again confirmed by Mo: ‘‘Apart of some
relatively short periods of disintegration between dynasties, the autocrats seldom
experienced long-lasting and fierce competition. … Without effective competition,
instead of enriching the states and strengthening the army, the autocrats indulged in
conspicuous consumption and chose politics to extend their privileges and to ease
their chances of maintaining power…which resulted in long-lasting stagnation in
imperial China’’ (Mo 2004, pp. 58, 59).
The reader may find a graphical illustration of later Asia and later Europe in
Fig. 2. The large circles illustrate the autocratic regimes of China and India, in
particular Moghul India which was a centralized regime as well, but consider
Blankart (2007) for a discussion of the Indian regimes some of which were less
centralized. The small circles in the West stand for the competitive states of Europe,
while the Ottoman Empire in the middle represents a mixed case. Our hypothesis on
split territories is confirmed by the example of Japan in the Far East. Japan is also
characterized by a broken territory and was decentralized from the fourth century up
1 The idea of competitive feudal system is also proposed by Weede (2000).
2 No distinction is made between population and income per capita because the latter is not available.
Feuerwerker convincingly writes on China: ‘‘No population can grow at any significant degree for any
length of time without the total production of the economy increasing in some proportionate measure.’’
3 Growth during the Sun Yat Sen Republic of 1912 was destroyed in the civil and Japanese wars through
1950.
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to the Tokugawa period which ended in the late 19th century (Schefold 2001;
Distelrath 2004).
4 Philosophers on homo oeconomicus and land
It is argued in this paper that taxation in a country results from the interaction of
population growth and land. Some readers may be perplexed on the relevance of
land, but looking back in the history of philosophical thought the use of land is not
at all strange. It can be found in the works of renowned philosophers such as David
Hume and Charles de Montesquieu.
The first to discover the relationship between land and government was David
Hume. In his essay ‘‘Of the Rise and Progress of Arts and Sciences’’ 1742, he
writes:
‘‘… Europe is at present a copy at large of what Greece was formerly a pattern in
miniature…If we consider the face of the globe, Europe, of all four parts of the
world, is the most broken by seas, rivers and mountains and Greece of all countries
of Europe. Hence, these regions were naturally divided into several distinct
Ottoman 
Empire China
India
Fig. 2 Natural autocracy in Asia and systems competition in Europe and in Japan. Source: own
adjustments to untraceable background source
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governments. And hence the sciences arose in Greece; and Europe has been hitherto
the most constant habitation of them.’’ (Hume 1788, pp. 135; 137).
A few years later Charles de Montesquieu made a similar observation in his
book « De l’esprit des lois » : (1748)
‘‘In Asia they have always had great empires; in Europe these could never
subsist. Asia has larger plains; … and the rivers being not so large form more
contracted barriers.4 Power in Asia ought, then to be always despotic; … In Europe
the natural division forms many nations of a moderate extent, in which the ruling by
laws is not incompatible with the maintenance of the State; in the contrary; it is so
favourable to it that without this the state would fall into decay and become a prey
of its neighbours. This is which has formed the genius of liberty.’’ (Montesquieu
et al. 1748, 17th book, Ch. 6).
Hume and Montesquieu found that it is not just by accident that large contiguous
countries tend to become autocracies, while geographically split countries often
have decentralized competitive governments.
5 Statistical records
5.1 Geniuses: by Alfred Kroeber and Charles Murray
The Hume-Montesquieu hypothesis of systems competition and growth has been
summarized by the German-American scholar Alfred Kroeber (1944) who
succeeded in providing a first statistical account of the inventive capacity of the
world. Kroeber searched through all available encyclopedias of the world and
counted the number of geniuses including those in visual and performing arts since
antiquity. He found that the West had two-thirds of all geniuses, but only one-fourth
of the population, whereas the East (without Japan) had one-third of the geniuses
and artists, but three-fourth of the population (Table 2).
Kroeber’s impressive data have been criticized for being Eurocentric. Therefore,
Charles Murray (2003) has reviewed and summarized Kroeber’s work 50 years later
by counting human accomplishments since antiquity but now doing so with the help
of computers. His list encompasses 4.002 excellent personalities in natural science,
philosophy, visible art, literature and music in Europe, in the rest of the West and
everywhere else between 800 B.C. and 1950 A.C. Fig. 3 shows that the majority of
all genial accomplishments have been generated since the fifteenth century,
especially since the nineteenth century. What is most surprising is that the number
of geniuses in Murray’s work is even more Eurocentric than in Kroeber’s record. As
late as 1880, 81 percent of the new geniuses came from Europe, thereafter Europe’s
share dropped, but was still about 60 percent in the 1940s. Nowadays the number of
geniuses increases faster in the ‘‘Rest of the West’’, especially in the U.S.
In order to avoid the criticism of a European bias, Murray counted the artists in
China, in India and in Japan separately whereas he aggregated them over all
4 ‘‘Contracted’’ or man-made rather than natural.
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European states. But as can be seen from Fig. 3, Europe still ranges first in the
sample.
Another Western prejudice could come from Murray’s additive method of
counting inventories. If a large number of single accomplishments such as the
wheel, the plow, the stirrup, the gun powder, the eyeglasses and the mechanical
clock are simply added up it cannot be excluded that some of them had already been
known in very early centuries in Asia and therefore receive too much weight in
Murray’s accounts. This danger is reduced if not single but rather meta-inventions
are counted, i.e. those that generated secondary inventions. Murray defines 14 such
meta-inventions in his work and then looks back to the origins where they come
from. Indeed some of them come from outside Europe such the Arabic numerals
including the number zero: they may have been invented by Indian-Arab
Table 2 Geniuses in arts and sciences 500 B.C. until 1899 A.C
Geniuses, thinkers and
artists from 500 B.C.
to the end of the
nineteenth century
Percent Population
around 1500
A.D. in million
Percent
Europe und Western
descendants
626 64 90,518 25
China 175 18 103,000 29
India 51 5 110,000 31
Middle East 123 13 55,400 15
TOTAL 975 100 358,918 100
Without Japan with 15,400 million, Latin America with 17,500 million inhabitants and Africa with
46,610 million inhabitants
Sources: own compilation based on Kroeber (1944), and Naroll (1971), Population from A. Maddison (2003)
Europe Rest of the West Rest of the World 
B.C. 
N
um
be
r 
o
f g
en
iu
se
s 
 
B.C. 
Fig. 3 Geniuses in the world. Source: own compilation based on Charles Murray (2003)
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mathematicians at the end of the 8th century A.D. Similarly, meditation appeared in
India around 200 B.C. and ethics coming from China (and from Greece) may be
assessed at around 500–300 B.C. But most meta-inventions quoted by Murray
originate from Europe, particularly those from philosophy and mathematics, among
which the logic of the mathematical proof and the treatment of uncertainty, nature
as an object of observation and the scientific methodology are the most important.
Similarly, meta-inventions in arts: Realism, the perspective abstract art, polyphony,
drama and the novel seem to be of European origin.
5.2 Angus Maddison: comparative economic growth
The Great Divergence in GDP per capita is demonstrated impressively in the statistical
record by Angus Maddison (2003 on Table 3). Following his data, all regions of the
World including China started with the same GDP per capita of about 400 US $ around
the year 1 A.D. Europe’s GDP shrunk during the first period from year 1 to year 1000
from 450 to 400 US$ per capita due to the collapse of the Roman Empire and the
following migration period. But it resumed substantially after 1500 from 771 US$ per
capita to 4 579 US$ per capita in 1950 and reached 19 912 US$ per capita in 2003. The
greatest lead of Europe over China was 10:1 in 1950, it then declined to 4:1 in 2003.
The West European Offshoots in the New Worlds were even more remarkable: they
attained 28 039 US$ per capita or 6:1 in 2003.5
6 Conclusions and generalization
Eric Jones correctly observes that
• Traditional China had excessive taxes and low economic growth
• Traditional Europe had lower taxes and higher economic growth.
Table 3 Economic Growth in Asia and in the West from year 1 to 2003
Real GNP per capita
1 1000 1500 1950 2003
China 450 450 600 439 4,803
Japan 400 425 500 1,921 21,218
India 450 450 550 619 2,160
W’Europe 450 400 771 4,579 19,912
W’European offshoots 400 400 400 9,268 28,039
World 445 436 566 2,111 6,516
Source: OECD data
Own compilation
5 Estimates of Roman GDP (PPP) per capita (see Maddison 2003).
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A simple answer is to say that China had an autocratic tax system and Europe a
competitive tax system. But this answer does not explain why China’s tax system
was autocratic and why Europe’s tax system is competitive? We therefore have to
ask what a bureaucrat has to consider if he wants to maximize tax revenues in pre-
modern China or in Europe respectively.
A bureaucrats’ problem is to join land and individuals for taxation. For land
cannot be taxed without individuals and individuals cannot be taxed without land. In
an archaic territory where land is abundant and population small or absent, taxation
is not feasible. Hunter-gatherers will simply withdraw from landowners’ land
making taxation impossible in China as well as in Europe.
Taxation becomes feasible when population grows into a geographically
contiguous territory which is gradually filled by individuals who now can be tied
to the land and taxed. We believe that contiguity holds approximately for
continental China. If land is, however, not contiguous, but split as in Europe, the
extension of a dominion is costly allowing, on the one hand, taxpayers to escape
from taxation and, on the other hand, rival governments to establish power in remote
areas. Contiguity of land allows an understanding why an authoritarian tax system
can be established in China and remain stable there despite of its presumed
inefficiency for growth. In Europe, whose territory is split, governments are in
permanent competition and an authoritarian tax system is not feasible. The political
economy of contiguous versus split domains may explain the phenomenon of The
Great Divergence between Europe and China.
We believe that our theory has a broader application: it can explain to some
extent the stability and instability of political regimes in general.
The example of China has shown that contiguous territories join to non-
competitive entities and may become stable non-contested nations that remain
stable and seldom disappear. China, Russia, the United States, the united Germany
(1871) and South Africa are examples.
Split territories remain competitive and contestable and are, as such, always
unstable and prone to dissolution. Examples are the later Roman Empire, the
Colonial Empires of Europe, the two Pakistans, the former United Arab Republic
(of Egypt and Syria) and the European Union.
We concede that not all countries can be encompassed by our theory. Deviant
cases are Indonesia, the Philippines and former Yugoslavia, but nevertheless, we
believe that the nature of split versus contiguous geographies can contribute to a
better understanding of the stability or instability of nations.
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